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Since 1970, there has been unprecedented volatility in oil
prices. The peak was in November 1981, when Saudi Arabia raised the
price of its marker crude to $34, or $41 in mid-1986 dollars. In real
terms, that was about 13 times the 1970 level.
However, by November 1985, the price was down, in real terms, by
over a third, to about $26. In the next few months, the price fell
precipitately, then stabilized between $10 and $15.
The prospect for the next ten years, as I see it, is for the price
of oil to fluctuate between a competitive floor around $S and a
monopoly ceiling around $25.
The Developing Member Countries (DMCs) must, like everybody
else, cope with $15 oil that may often rise or fall by that much.
2DEMAND
Nobody disagrees today that higher prices discourage oil
consumption, lower prices encourage them. It depends on how high or
low, and on the time period allowed.
FIGURE 1
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The United States is a good laboratory sample to study demand
because world oil has always been priced in dollars. Therefore the
changes in consumer prices have reflected changes in crude oil prices
more promptly there than elsewhere, especially after 1979, when price
controls were abolished.
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3Figure 1 shows how the changes n USA oil product use stayed very
close to changes in the GNP from 1973 to 1977, but then swung away in
delayed response to the first price explosion. They continued down,
propelled by the second price explosion.
From 1981 to 1985, GNP in the USA rose by about 11 percent,
and oil product prices fell by about 25 percent, real. Yet oil
product use kept on declining. Not until after the big price drop, in
the second quarter of 1986, when oil prices had fallen by another 25
percent, did oil consumption per unit of GNP begin to increase.
I believe it will continue to ncrease if the price of crude oil
stays at its present levels or rises only moderately, to not more than
$20.
But increasing consumption will not get back to past growth rates,
for several reasons. Energy saving technology is irreversible. The
industrial countries are much more automobilesaturated. Natural gas
will displace oil, and oil taxes will stay higher. Finally, the very
fact that oil prices move up and down so much will discourage consumers
from moving back to oil.
Chevron Oil Co. recently stated a consensus view: world gross
product to grow by 3 percent through 2000 A. 0., energy demand by only
2-plus percent, oil at less than 1 percent.
At such rates of Increase, cumulative production will not strain
existing known oil resources, let alone discoveries.
4But oil resources have always been ample, and yet prices have
increased. It is time to look at projections of demand and supply in
the light of experience.
FIGURE 2
ACTUAL EXPECTED PRICES
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, : ^"
-0
O
0O
a
C
bC)c
400
200
150
100
50
,,
1970
POLL
MEOIANS
ACTUAL
PRICES
S. IMPORTS)
1980 85 1990 2000
COMPARISON OF FIVE. SUCCESSIVE IEW POL
AND ACTUAL PRICES
Figure 2 shows the history of prices since 1970, and shows the
median forecast made by varying expert groups, compiled by the
International Energy Workshop. In 1981, it started with the
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5then-current price, and projected it far upward. In the five years
since then, the projection has not changed. The starting point is
always lower, but the expectation for the future is the same.
The reason for this fixed unchangeable opinion is so widely
assumed that is rarely stated: Consumption rises exponentially, much
of the "finite resources' are used up, and higher prices must follow as
the night the day. Therefore oil and gas reserves are low-risk
appreciating assets.
This is a perfectly general theory, and holds for every mineral,
including oil. It is striking contradiction to the facts. With few
exceptions, minerals prices have trended downward for as long as we
have any reliable statistics. This has continued at least through
1985.
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7When a theory leads to universally wrong results, it is time to
amend it, or discard t. I think some reflection will show that
resources--what's in the earth--are not a binding constraint.
We will never run out of oil, coal, gas, metals, non-metallic
minerals, etc. We will stop digging for any one of them when and if
the cost of providing new nventory--reserves-- exceeds the expected
discounted price. What's then left in the earth is unknowable, and it
would not matter if we did know it.
The real-world problem is not a fixed stock but the cost of
providing a flow. This cost tends to rise because of diminishing
returns. In any given area at any given time, the odds are we will
find the biggest fields first, even by blind chance, because they are
biggest. Furthermore, it is rational to exploit the best first. With
no offset to diminishing returns, life would be one long slide from
good to bad, and from bad to worse.
But diminishing returns are offset by increasing knowledge,
both of the earth's crust and of better methods of locating and
exploiting mineral deposits. The one rule we can trust is that mineral
scarcity, and mineral prices, are the uncertain fluctuating resultant
of opposing forces.
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9Figure 4 shows the price of oil from 1912 to 1986. The solid line
is the USA, but from 1948 through about 1971, it was kept artificially
high by restricting imports. The broken line shows an arm's-length
price (not a posted price) at the Persian Gulf. We will shortly ask
why the abrupt change in 1974.
Because minerals prices and costs fluctuate, mineral reserves are
risky assets, like most other assets. Producers (and others) are
constantly in the business of appraising them. They make constant
comparisons of investment requirements per unit of additional oil
versus expected prices.
If the cost of providing new reserves rises, then everybody is on
notice that prices must also rise. The value of reserves already
known, in the ground, must also rise. It will then pay to withhold
high-cost oil from current production and development. This reduces
the supply and raises the price of oil right now.
Thus n a regime of competitive markets future shortages and
surpluses are perceived in time to allow adaptation. Mankind never has
been in danger of riding blindly off the cliff of unforeseen scarcity.
That is why the idea of an energy crisis' never made any sense.
Of course the appraisals of private markets are no better than the
data and analysis used. Buyers and sellers may be very wrong. But a
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market in oil and oil properties, is also a market in ideas. There are
strong incentives to correct mistakes, and seek out and use new data.
There was no underpricing of oil in the 1960s. Investment
requirements per additional barrel of crude oil capacity were steady to
declining. There was no ndication of any increase in the price of
reserves in the USA (the only observed market). These data refute the
notion that there was any approaching scarcity.
The new force, which made the difference, was the cartell of the
OPEC nations (not OPEC itself, which is at most a forum for
discussion).
THE UNIQUE CARTEL
This cartel is unique in being a group of sellers who are also
sovereign states.
Wealth maximizing Like private firms, the cartel nations
are profit- or wealth-maxtmtzers. Their political nterests and
objectives do not affect their price-production behavior. The more
wealth, the easier to reach the goal, whatever the goal.
1 Some readers may find the use of 'cartel' and mono-
poly" offensive when applied to a nation or group of nations. It
is used in the simple economic sense: a seller or group of
sellers who cooperate to make the price higher, and output volume
lower, than if they did nothing.
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Since the oil is nearly all exported, the benefits go to the local
economy, the cost is borne by foreigners. Hence there is no internal
opposition to high prices, nor any dispute about whether a higher oil
price helps more people than it hurts. Seller-governments, acting
together, are free to raise the price to what the traffic will bear.
Governments' short horizons The OPEC nations must, as rational
asset owners, use shorter time horizons and higher discount rates
than equally rational private corporations. The nations' revenues
fluctuate more, and they are undiversified.
1. Non-cartel producers are price takers who sell all they can
produce. The cartel nations produce only what they can sell without
undermining the price. Hence the fluctuations in cartel sales and
revenues are greater than in total crude oil sales. They find this a
burden, of course, and are trying hard to shed it--with negligible
success.
2. The cartel governments are heavily committed to domestic and
foreign spending. They are like heavily leveraged private firms with
most income pre-comitted to debt service. Fluctuations of net or
disposable income are correspondingly greater.
3. Some of these governments are unstable, and unruly to
each other; the Iran-Iraq war has already produced some 300,000
dead.
4. The nation-owners, as small LDCs, have no portfolio of
assets, or assortment of incomes, against which to diversify oil
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income. With the partial and minor exception of Kuwait, they have not
built up enough assets to diversify. Their investments in domestic
industries have not provided any substantial non-oil ncomes. Of the
thirteen OPEC nations, only Indonesia has a large enough economy to
provide even a minor element of diversification.
The market discount rate or cost of capital for private oil
and gas production firms appears to be about 10 percent, real. For
the OPEC nations, as rational actors, it ought to be well over twice as
high.2
In saying that the OPEC nations should use much higher discount
rates, we do not imply that they necessarily go through any formal
calculations at all. We are only trying to describe what they do as
producers and price-setters. A company or government which seizes
short-term gains and disregards longer-term penalties or trade-offs is,
whether they know it or not, discounting at a higher rate. A company
or government facing a given income stream will react according to
whether the stream is (1) highly leveraged and (2) folded into a larger
diversified income stream. If the stream is highly leveraged, and
2 In the language of finance, these nation-operators'
risk factor (Beta) is determined not by the covariance of oil
revenues with their other income flows, for these latter are
very small. Their risk is determined by the variance of the
oil income flow itself, which is very high. The subject is
covered in detail in a paper, "Oil Producing Countries' Discount
Rates', in Resources & Energy, December 1986.
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undiversified, the stream is very risky, and the owner will, to serve
himself, discount it at a high rate.
Because of short time horizons and high discount rates, the
intergovernmental cartel raised the price faster and higher than
would a monopoly with a private cost of capital. They have also
been slower to reduce the price for the sake of long-run maximization.
We now look at the environment in which this cartel must function
in the coming decade. There is general agreement that consumption will
slowly rise. It is less clear what happens to supply.
NON-CARTEL SUPPLY: THE COMPETITIVE SECTOR
Will non-cartel reserves run out?
It is widely assumed that non-cartel reserves are rather small in
relation to production, which must therefore run down pretty quickly.
But this derives from the basic error of treating reserves as
resources. It is also disproved by experience.
No area in the world is as drilled-up today as was the United
States in 1945. Over a million wells had been drilled, 30 billion
barrels produced, 20 billion "remaining recoverable reserves".
Discoveries of large fields had peaked during the 1920s, and could only
decline. Yet during the next 40 years, not 20 but 100 billion barrels
were produced (excluding Alaska), and 16 billion were left at the end
of last year.
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How did it happen? Many small fields were discovered, and the
large ones proved very expansible--sometimes amazingly so. Kern River
in California, discovered in 1899, had about 30 million barrels
"remaining recoverable reserves" in 1945, and about 900 million today.
Moreover, an old drilled-up oil province has a dense infrastructure of
pipelines and services which mean any additional reserves can be
quickly produced.
The problem, again, is cost. My calculations show a 1985 U. S.
average of $12 per barrel development-plus-operating. Of course it is
a false precision, indicating only the neighborhood of cost. About a
third of total U. S. development was of higher-cost reserves.
Therefore a price of $12 would not cause a quick rundown, but it would
curtail investment, hence production in the long run.
Costs to the operator are much lower today, partly because factor
prices are down--drilling rig rates, wage rates, materials and
supplies, etc. Equally important: since 1981, when the downturn began,
the efficiency of those factors is far up. The amount of feet drilled
per rig-year has more than doubled. In the first half of 1986 it is up
by one-fourth over first half 1985. Rigs running are down below their
1973 level; but the work they do is at the 1979 level. This growth in
efficiency explains the collapse in the oil service industries, and
great local distress. The cutback is not nearly as great outside
the USA, of course.
15
Rents, and ill-conceived price controls, explain why, when oil
prices in the USA were spiraling upward through 1981, gross reserve
additions dropped sharply in the USA; they were also very bad in 1982.
But over the next three years, as prices deteriorated,
reserve-additions rose to a near-record level, exceed only in 1949-51.
It has been alleged that the Saudis cut prices in order to destroy
the US producing industry. If my own calculations are anywhere near
correct, they would have to go well below current levels, and it would
take far too long to make it worth their while.
At any rate, if we use the USA as an extreme example of the
highest-cost non-OPEC production, it seems safe to say that if prices
recover to $20, then there will be no rundown of capacity in the United
States for years. At $5, there would be a fairly quick rundown, and at
S15, a slow one.
In October 1986, production in the United States outside of
Alaska was three to four percent below October 1985. There is nothing
to suggest a faster rate of decrease.
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NON-CARTEL SUPPLY: OUTSIDE USA
Here the picture is dominated by the delusion mentioned earlier,
that oil and natural gas are low-risk appreciating assets. Higher oil
prices actually reduced supply in many countries. Lower oil prices
since 1981 have promoted supply, and the process will speed up.
Before 1982, the higher prices went, the higher they were expected
to go. The higher they were expected to go, the more did non-cartel
governments with oil resources think they could benefit by withholding
oil and gas for later development. So governments often overtaxed,
regulated, or limited production or exports.
Governments with promising areas often demanded mpossible terms
from foreign oil companies. They felt unable to bear the accusation
that they were soft on big foreign oil companies, giving away the
national patrimony cheaply, or corruptly. So there was no bargain.
There was comfort in the thought that eventually they would get more.
But it was a cruel delusion. They would get less.
The phenomenon is best documented in Canada, the Netherlands, and
Norway, and in natural gas, which is a sleeping giant slowly awakening
in Europe.
In all three countries, when oil prices rose in the 1970s,
the governments curtailed gas production and exports. But when oil
prices began to weaken seriously n the 1980s all of them reversed
course. In Canada, the government had prevented gas exports out of
known reserves at $5 per Mcf. Sold in 1981, and invested at the
I
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riskless interest rate, that would be about $8.34 today. But today,
Canadian exports are now going at just over $2. That was a severe
capital loss on those supposedly low-risk appreciating assets.
The direct result of the 1986 collapse of oil prices was the
willingness of the Norwegian government to reduce taxes, and waive its
insistence on developing super-expensive unwanted Troll oil. Troll
gas, for which $7 was once demanded, will be sold at $3.50, or less.
Furthermore, as our research at M. I. T. has shown, gas from the Troll
field can profitably be sold at less than $2, once they have broken the
buyers' monopoly exercised in Germany by a large transmission-distribu-
tion company. Fifteen-dollar oil, or even somewhat less, will not
prevent Troll gas from backing out a million barrels of oil daily
sometime in the 1990s.
The Algerians, who have painted themselves into a corner by
demanding unattainable prices, will reconsider, the sooner the better
for them. The Russians, despite the misguided attempts of my own
Government to block them, have a great deal more gas to offer.
Oil demand will be unexpectedly weak in Europe, but the real
reason will be on the supply side--the competition of natural gas
because of lower prices.
As it becomes clear that current oil prices are not going back to
the 1981 peak, it will become worth while to undertake a great deal of
new discovery and development all over the world. I know no way to
18
estimate it, but the import is clear: the rate of development of
non-OPEC reserves will not dwindle.
Conceivably, the competitive price could stay below $10 for
decades. It might also rise. One thing is certain: if it is a
free-market price, t would take no such leaps as in the 1970s.
However, in my opinion the chances are small that the price will
stay at free market levels. Having sketched out the basic nature of
the cartel, and the supply-demand environment it faces, I would like to
look at the way it works, and the chances of survival.
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THE CARTEL IN THE NEXT DECADE
Permanent Instability There is a never-ending cycle:
agreement, firm to rising prices; cheating, price deterioration;
breakdown, then a new agreement. It s difficult to make an agreement,
and even harder to abide by t, but not impossible. The basic problem
is set by the same financial factors which drove cartel prices upward.
The cartel nations cannot afford to wait.
This makes for a basic instability, or circle. A higher price
brings higher revenues which lessen cheating and help support the
price. Contrariwise, lower prices promote cheating, hence even lower
prices. If lower revenues made the Iran-Iraq war sputter out, that
would depress or break the price.
The threat of a price collapse may promote panic, and the price
collapse itself. Or it may concentrate the minds of the cartel
members, and their collaborators, and help regain solidarity.
Hence there is no simple relation between the challenge--lower or
higher demand upon the cartel--and the response of a concerted orderly
output change. And this is why models which deduce the price of oil
from supply and demand are unreliable, and have repeatedly failed.
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RECENT CARTEL AND PRICE HISTORY
Relations among the cartel nations are dominated by large versus
small producers. The smaller members may cheat readily, knowing
that the others will cover for them. But the largest has no such
freedom. If he cheats, the agreement collapses.
But the largest seller cannot afford to become known as
everybody's favorite food. Hence the endless round of threats and then
action to make the threats good.
FIGURE 5
OPEC OUTPUT:SAUDI v. ALL OTHER
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Figure 5 shows what happened after 1979. Official prices were
below spot prices. But the OPEC governments exacted spot prices,
except for Saudi Arabia, which charged only official prices. This
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tactic was very advantageous to the Saudis. They maintained their
sales volume, while the other OPEC members absorbed the whole reduction
in demand, through February 1982. (Kuwait has been excluded from the
"all other", but included in the OPEC total.) At this time, the others
began to discount prices enough to divert business, and never afterward
did they lose sales. Saudi Arabia was now absorbing the full
reduction.
In January 1983, Saudi Arabia responded. They broke up an OPEC
meeting and within two months the rest had agreed to quotas, which they
adhered to, for about a year. Then price cheating re-commenced in the
Summer of 1984.
In November 1985, after innumerable threats, and with exports down
to 1.5 million barrels daily (where they had once been over 9) the
Saudis acted, with great restraint. It is widely believed that they
were trying to lower prices in order to knock high-cost producers (as
in the USA) out of the market, or force non-OPEC producers to
cooperate; or that they were trying to knock Iran out of the war, etc.,
etc. None of these theories will fit the facts. The Saudis could
easily have cut prices far down, or increaseoutput from 2 to 9 million
barrels daily.
In fact, the Saudis did not reduce prices, or increase output
beyond their quota. They offered only their full quota at netback
prices; that is, product prices less some stated allowance for
transport and refining costs. In effect, they matched the market
price.
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It was a clear message to their fellows: there is no longer any
use in cheating. No matter how low you go, we will automatically match
you. The Saudis did, to be sure, offer an extra inducement. The
product price, which after deductions became the netback price, was set
as the price at the time not of loading but of arrival, some six weeks
afterward, or even somewhat later. Thus they assumed the risk of
downward fluctation, which during a period of price weakness was a
substantial "sweetener".
As in 1983, they got their way, but this time it took nine months
instead of two, many meetings instead of one, and a price decline of 50
percent.
One is tempted to say: another such victory for the Saudis,
and they are all finished. But I believe the collapse, if it comes,
will be only temporary. The OPEC nations will keep trying.
Glutted markets will be a barrier to price increases, but they
overcome those barriers in the past. Cohesion, or the lack thereof,
will be all-important.
The clumsy cartel Ever since they ousted the companies, the
cartel has been forced to control price by changing output. They
respond to perceived total demand; non-cartel supply; and inventories.
Unfortunately, this guarantees price instability.
Short-run demand and supply are very inelastic. Even large
price changes produce only very small changes in the amount supplied or
the amount demanded. Conversely: even small output changes can yield
big price changes.
23
By the same token, small errors in the assumed data can have big
effects. But the cartel managers do not even have good current data.
Production figures are often falsified. Consumption numbers lag by
months in the ndustrial countries, and years in the LDCs. Inventories
are shaky even for the oil companies, and consumers' stocks are a
statistical black hole. Again and again, in recent years, inventories
have looked "irreducibly low", only to turn out high. One reason, of
course, is that high prices have taught everybody to economize, and the
new techniques learned will not be abandoned at lower prices.
The International Energy Agency has estimated that during
July-August 1986, world production exceeded consumption by 2.6 mbd, yet
it could report a stock build at the rate of only 0.8 mbd. The error
is twice the estimate. This ignorance is chronic and permanent.
Hence one must expect that a cartel-fixed price or production
schedule will not normally clear the market.
In competitive markets, the numerous actors are free to make many
immediate small corrections of demand or supply. But concerted cartel
management of supply makes timely corrections slow at best, difficult
to make at all. Overdue changes set off anticipations of large price
movements, and often amplify them.
In success and failure alike, the cartel is clumsy and
disruptive. But they would be foolish simply to stop trying. The
lesson has been learned: the world oil market can be monopolized, and
the rewards thereof are immense. If OPEC were formally disbanded, a
new organization would replace it, with membership not much changed.
The last thing to be expected is smooth convergence to any supply-de-
mand equilibrium.
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CONCLUSIONS & POLICY SUGGESTIONS
The current price, about $12 per barrel at the Persian Gulf and
$15 at the U. S. Gulf Coast, is very high by historical standards and
in relation to cost.
At this price, there is no question of supply stringency.
Reserves and resources are ample to the end of the century, at least.
Nobody knows how far past they will suffice.
But despite ample supply, the price will remain unstable, because
it is governed by a clumsy cartel, which finds it difficult to make and
enforce agreements on output division.
All of the Developing Member Countries (DMCs) must cope with these
conditions as consumers. Some of them are exporters, and nearly all
are potential producers of oil or gas or both.
Consumers. It is an advantage to have import contracts, since
this saves both buyers and sellers the work of perpetually looking for
each other, and drawing up the terms for every single cargo. But no
supplier can guarantee price or delivery, because nobody knows when the
next crisis will intervene, or the next price increase or decrease.
Import prices, whether negotiated directly by a DMC, or approved
by it, should be related to published netback prices. Movements in
these prices should be indexed to movements in netbacks at Singapore,
with additional indexes to other great refining centers, e. g.
Rotterdam, Houston.
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The only insurance against supply disruptions is in a stockpile.
Storage of crude oil is expensive, because of the need to contain the
volatile components. However, storage of heavy fuel oil, and of coal,
is cheap. The principal component is the nvestment in the fuel
itself. But for dual-firing plants located on tidewater, this can be
made to pay for itself, as it did in the United States and Europe
before the 1970s. It permits the power plant to buy the cheapest fuel
on the market at any time.
Away from tidewater, where natural gas is available, power plants
should be oil-gas dual-firing, for the sake of security. The
investment is much less than in oil-coal dual-firing. Natural gas will
be discussed further below.
Producers Many members have good prospects of oil or gas
production. Oil and gas deposits are not appreciating assets.
In fact, their value has depreciated more than 60 percent in the last
five years. Moreover, later revenues are not worth as much as earlier.
Waiting for price increases has already cost some nations dear, as our
examples of Canada and Norway showed.
DMCs should proceed as rapidly as possible to negotiate with all
competent oil companies, foreign and domestic, for exploration and
development. The objective should be to obtain the maximum present
value of total revenues, not the maximum royalty per unit of oil or
gas.
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LNG Projects3 The DMCs are in an area where hydrocarbons are
likely to be gas. A few years ago, gas could be sold at delivered
prices n Japan and Korea of about $5 per thousand cubic feet. No such
prices are conceivable today. When the prices are re-negotiable a few
years hence, they will probably be lowered drastically.
Delivered prices of LNG were set to equal or even somewhat
exceed crude oil prices. But this was the result of panic about
scarcity. Under more normal and competitive conditions, it is likely
that gas prices will settle out somewhat below equivalent crude oil
prices. Basically this is because a barrel of crude is worth the
products it contains, less refining costs. But gas can not substitute
for oil in its most valuable uses: motor gasoline and jet fuel. It can
substitute only in stationary appliances, burning light or heavy fuel
oil (or illuminating kerosine.) Furthermore, its delivery cost to the
burner tip is greater. Hence with crude oil expected to stay around
$15, a competitive price for gas could hardly exceed $2.50, and would
probably be less.
We can work back from the value of LNG as delivered, to the value
at the natural gas wellhead as follows, assuming a shipment distance of
4,000 miles:
This discussion sumrtizes East Asia/Pacific Natural
Gas Trade a report of the International Natural Gas Trade
Project of the Energy Laboratory at M. I. T. (March 1986).
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LNG price, del vered: $2.50
less RegasificatiOn .35
lt s Shipment (tanker) .80
Test Liquefaction 1.00
Tquals Wellhead value STO75
Obviously the wellhead value ts very sensitive to the delivered
price. This wellhead value must be compared with production cost. we
have dealt only with known fields, in order to calculate a price which
would make it worthwhile to drill and otherwise develop new capacity.
Our "base case' estimate for offshore production cost in the area
of the South China Sea was 26 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf),
assuming a 12 percent real rate of return. However, costs in four
offshore felds in which we had some individual information ranged from
26 cents (Thailand, "8o Structure; China, Yacheng) to 51 cents
(Malaysta, Central Luconia). Obviously, with costs only mildly above
our base case, there is not much left here in excess rent to be
absorbed by the host government.
The only hopeful aspect I can discern here s the possible
reduction n cost. Production costs have dropped sharply in the United
States since 1984. uch more important is the possible decline in LNG
construction costs. They ncreased by a factor of five 'frm 1974 to
1983. uch of the increase was of course general inflation, which has
not bel reversed; but even more was nflation In this particular kind
of pla and nobody can doubt that by 1983 t was heavily padded with
'rents' whtch can be reduced.
28
Thus it would be an exaggeration to say that LNG projects are
dead for the next generation. But few If any will be viable.
Hence it would be more profitable for the DMCs to promote natural
gas development in order to back out oil imports, or to free up
oil for additional exports. Instead of the value of the gas being 45
cents, it would be 2.50.
